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e recent European Union pro-
posal to bring about a more
uniform body of law govern-
ing choice of law and related issues
in international inheritance cases is,
perhaps, a necessary response to the
increasingly international nature of
the EU's (and the world's) inhabitants
and their assets. As written, though, it
is rather heavily tilted toward the civil
law values of continental Europe and
threatens to collide jarringly with com-
mon law traditions, in particular the
U.S. fondness for trusts and charitable
giving.
Different cultures of philanthropy
exist in the United States and Europe,
especially continental Europe. The
people of the United States contrib-
ute nearly 2% of the country's GDP to
charities each year, a rate four or more
times as high as that in most of con-
tinental Europe. The existence of a
charitable-giving deduction in the U.S.
tax code is often cited as a reason. But
that by itself seems insufficient; the tax
code provides no incentive to the low-
income families, who donate an even
higher proportion of their income to
charity than their wealthier compatri-
ots, and little incentive to the wealthy,
whose tax relief from charitable con-
tributions may be limited. In fact, a
2006 survey of wealthy donors found
most of them claiming that the pres-
ence or absence of tax incentives had
no effect on their decisions. Nor do
broader cultural factors seem sufficient
to explain the disparity. Notwith-
standing the delight Americans and
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Western Europeans take in discover-
ing and exaggerating their respective
cultural differences, in reality the dif-
ferences are not that great. And while
the level of government-provided
social services is higher in most Euro-
pean countries than in the United
States, that does not eliminate the need
for domestic charitable giving in those
countries and should have no effect on
international giving.
Although all of these factors-taxa-
tion, government services, and cultural
differences-play a part, there may
be others as well. Much American
charitable giving is done by bequest,
including the popular planned-giving
options that allow a donor to con-
tinue to receive the income from a gift
during his or her life. It may be that
charitable giving by bequest is done
less frequently in Europe because tes-
tamentary freedom is restricted under
the legal systems of most European
countries.
In most of the countries of the Euro-
pean Union, the United Kingdom
aside, it is forbidden for a testator with
living children to deny those children
a share of the estate. Forced heirship
laws protect children who have been
left less than their legally determined
share; a bequest to a charitable orga-
nization will fail if it cuts into this
protected share. Even testators with-
out children may have no choice but
to leave a substantial portion of their
estates to certain surviving relatives.
Nor can the problem be avoided by
an inter vivos gift; many EU countries
have "clawback" laws that allow heirs
to reclaim gifts given during the testa-
tor's lifetime.
Analogues of forced heirship exist
in other forms in the Anglo-Amer-
ican legal tradition; the idea that it
should be difficult for a testator com-
pletely to disinherit a spouse (or even
a child) might be one many UKand
U.S. lawyers would disagree wit but
is unlikely to shock. Clawbacks are
a different matter; with a few mior
exceptions, although they are a theo-
retical possibility, they are so rare that
the reaction of an American or Brt-
ish lawyer (to say nothing of a client)
encountering clawbacks for the first
time is likely to be stunned disbelief.
Clawbacks seem rooted in a completely
different view of property, in which
every property owner holds but a life
estate, with his or her eventual heirs as
remainderpersons.
For centuries these inconsistent
views of property and inheritance have
existed with little interaction; claw-
backs were a vaguely horrifying but
comfortingly irrelevant oddity, found
somewhere safely beyond the borders.
But the increasing interconnectedness
of the world's peoples and legal sys-
tems is diminishing that comforting
distance. Today hundreds of millions of
people live, work, marry, have children,
and acquire and dispose of property
in more than one country; 5 million
people born in Europe now live in the
United States. A charity in the United
States that accepts a large gift can find
itself embroiled in litigation decades-
perhaps even a century-later, if the
donor dies leaving an estate governed
by (or at least arguably governed by)
another country's inheritance laws.
In the European Union, there are
now nearly half a million multistate
successions-situations in which a
decedent leaves assets in more than
one country-each year. This has
inspired the EU to seek a unified sys-
tem of inheritance law, or at least of
choice of inheritance law, toward
which the EU proposal is the first but
surely not the last step. And the inter-
connectedness of the global economy in
general, and the United States and the
European Union in particular, means
that changes made in Europe can have
drastic effects on charitable giving and
inheritance in the United States.
Differences in Inheritance
Laws: Forced Heirship and
Clawbacks
Two fundamental differences exist
between the ineritance laws of most
English-speakin countries and those
of most of continental Europe: forced
heirship and clawbacks.
Forced heirship or a rough equiva-
lent exists for spouses in ali U.S. states
except Georgia, either through an
elective forced share or through com-
California testator can explicitly disin-
herit a spouse, and inheritance rights
may be waived during the decedent's
life by the spouse, for example, by a
prenuptial agreement. Louisiana, the
United States' lone civil-law state, pro-
vides forced heirship rights for children
under age 23 or under an incapacity,
but a child can still be disinherited for
"'just cause." See, e.g., Katherine Shaw
Spaht, The Remnant of Forced Heirship:
The Interrelationship of Undue Influ-
ence, What's Become of Disinherison, and
the Unfinished Business of the Steppar-
ent Usufruct, 60 La. L. Rev. 637 (2000)
munity property law. Community
property states such as California may
provide multiple protections. But a
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(discussing the extent to which forced
heirship still exists after legislative
changes in the late 1990s).
In most European legal systems
the main goal of forced heirship
seems to be to keep assets in the line
of descent, almost as if they were
entailed. In those U.S. states that have
elective share statutes, the statutes
protect spouses, not children, par-
ents, or other heirs; they are more an
extension of marital property con-
cepts than of heirship concepts. The
elective share in the United States
is thus a more modem form of the
English law of dower and curtesy,
which themselves still exist, in some-
what modified forms, in Arkansas,
Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio. In
addition, statutorily created rights in
other states may be essentially iden-
tical to common-law dower under
other names and minus, of course, the
explicit common-law gender bias. At
common law, interestingly, freeholds
given inter vivos by the husband
were potentially subject to clawback
to satisfy dower rights. See, e.g., Hall
v. McBride, 416 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1982)
("At common law, a widow who was
not satisfied with the portion her
husband gave her in his will, could
seek a writ of dower unde nihil habiut
against the tenant of the freehold. If
she established her right to the writ,
she assigned her dower to the sher-
iff. Finally, an action of ejectment
was brought against the current land
holder."). Other factors, including
pretermitted heir statutes, the undue
influence doctrine, and the financial
and emotional cost of an inheritance
battle, may reflect some of the social
values codified in the civil law system,
although they are far more restricted
in scope.
As noted, forced heirship is the more
easily acceptable part; clawbacks are
less palatable. Two concepts, each of
which has analogues in U.S. law, will
help in understanding the operation of
clawbacks: the legiti or reserve and
te fictive hereditary mass. Te legitim
or reserve is the portion of the estate
subject to forced heirship-that is, the
portion the testator is not free to dis-
pose of as he or she wishes but which
must pass instead to persons within a
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small category of close relatives, typi-
cally issue, ancestors, and surviving
spouses.
The fictive hereditary mass is the
combined value of the decedent's
assets and some or all inter vivos
gifts made by the decedent,less debts.
See Paul Delnoy, Les libiralitis et les
successions 237 (1st ed. 1991). In coun-
tries applying clawbacks, the forced
heirship share is assessed not as a per-
centage of the decedent's estate but as
a percentage of the fictive hereditary
mass. To complicate matters further,
not all inter vivos gifts are included in
the fictive hereditary mass, but which
gifts are excluded varies from one
country to the next. The fictive hered-
itary mass has an inexact analogue
in the U.S. concept of the augmented
estate, which can include some of the
testator's inter vivos gifts.
In the United States, however, there
is at least an initial tendency to view
completed gifts as gone, although there
are some exceptions. The expectations
of U.S. donees are thus at odds with
those of non-U.S. potential forced heirs.
The effect of this clash of expectations,
expressed in actions to claw back char-
itable donations and assets placed in
trust, is potentially disastrous: a donor
might give three-quarters of her wealth
to, say, the San Diego Zoo, then live
another 60 years. In some countries, her
descendants might be able to claw back
part of that money up to 30 years after
the date of death-90 years after the
original gift. A California court might,
of course, refuse to recognize the judg-
ment, although the zoo's assets in other
countries, if any, might become vulner-
able to it.
The countries that permit clawbacks
permit tem under widely varying
terms. For example, Bulgarian law may
set aside up to five-sixth of the fic-
tive hereditary mass for the children
and surviving spouse, leaving only
one-sixth to be otherwise disposed
of either inter vivos or by will. See
Stela Ivanova, Erbrecht in Bulgarien, in
Erbrecht in Europa 702 (Rembert Sifi
& Ulrich Haas eds., 1st ed. 2004). At the
other end of the spectru,Denmark-
within the independent Scandinavian
legal tradition-accords testamen-
tary freedom approaching that of the
Anglo-American countries. Denmark
appears not to apply the concept of fic-
tive hereditary mass in most cases, and
thus there are no clawbacks-although
in contrast to U.S. practice the children
as well as the surviving spouse are enti-
tled to elective shares. In the countries
lying between these extremes, spe-
cific provisions and applications can
vary greatly; in Germany, for example,
although the fictive hereditary mass
and forced heirship (and thus claw-
backs) exist, property may be clawed
back only from the immediate donee;
those who receive property in good
faith from a donee are protected. In
Belgium, on the other hand, nonfun-
gible assets (such as real property)
may in some circumstances be clawed
back not only from the original donee
but from remote grantees-even if the
remote grantee is a bona fide purchaser
for value.
The concepts of fictive hereditary
mass and forced heirship are not, per-
haps, utterly alien to U.S. law. The
fictive hereditary mass has its rough
counterpart in the augmented, net, or
elective estate, while forced heirship,
at least for spouses, exists in the form
of the elective share. (The augmented
estate, under Uniform Probate Code
§ 2-203, includes the net probate estate
as well as the decedent's nonprobate
transfers-including inter vivos gifts-
and the surviving spouse's property
and inter vivos transfers, less funeral
and administration expenses and cer-
tain other exemptions and claims.)
Even the clawback may exist where an
elective share based on the augmented,
net, or elective estate exceeds the pro-
bate estate-that is, where the testator
has transferred more than half of his or
her wealth inter vivos. Such clawback
actions remain vanishigly rare in the
United States, though, and are more
likely to involve attempts to disinherit
a spouse through transfers to a trust
than with charitable gifts. See, e.g., Dre-
her v. Dreher, 634 S.E.2d 646 (S.C. 2006);
Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572 (Mass.
1984); Burns v. Turnbull, 41 N.Y.S.2d
448 (N.Y App. Div. 1943), affirmed,
62 N.E.2d 785 (N.Y. 1945); Newman v.
Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966 (N.Y 1937). Mort-
main statutes, while they still existed,
also acted as de facto clawbacks,
invalidaing charitable bequests made
shortly before death. See generally
John R. Cunningham, Mortmain Stat-
utes: The Dead Hand Still Survives, 27
Idaho L. Rev. 49 (1990-91); Shirley Nor-
wood Jones, The Demise ofMortmain in
the United States, 12 Miss. C. L. Rev. 407
(1991-92); In re Estate of Kirk, 907 P.2d
794 (Idaho 1995). And gifts causa mortis
may be revocable under certain cir-
cumstances, providing another form of
stealth clawback.
The concept of the augmented estate
is necessary only if there is a forced
heir whose share may be assessed
against it. Other valuations of the
estate are used for other purposes,
such as assessing estate tax. And the
clawback is not outside the contem-
plation of the UPC. UPC § 2-209(c)
provides:
If ... the elective-share or supple-
mental elective-share amount is not
fully satisfied, the remaining por-
tion of the decedent's nonprobate
transfers to others is so applied that
liability for the unsatisfied balance
of the elective-share or supple-
mental elective-share amount is
equitably apportioned among the
recipients of the remaining portion
of the decedent's nonprobate trans-
fers to others in proportion to the
value of their interests therein.
In other words, the decedent's inter
vivos gifts may be reached to satisfy
the surviving spouse's elective share.
For example, assets placed in a charita-
ble remainder trust "may be included
in the augmented estate and, therefore,
may be used to determine and satisfy
the elective share amount."
Why it Matters
Te differences between the treatments
of forced heirship and clawbacks in the
Anglo-American and civil law tradi-
tions have existed for centuries. Only
recently, however, have these differ-
ences become a problem, because of
the increasing mobility of persons
w~orldwide and the increasing indi-
vidual and societal wealt that has
made possible a culture of retirement.
More people do and will continue to
grow old and die in countries other
than those in which they were born,
acquired their wealth, and had children.
Other recent developments, such as
the current S.1746, proposing to grant
legal residence to persons purchasing
homes in the United States, may greatly
increase the number of foreign retir-
ees in the United States and thus the
eventual number of international inher-
itance cases. And even in the absence of
changing one's residence, it is now rel-
atively simple to acquire property and
financial interests in other countries
without ever leaving home.
The EU Proposal
The most administratively appealing
long-term solution to any interna-
tional conflict of laws is also the most
politically impossible (and, perhaps,
politically and culturally undesirable):
harmonization of national laws to elim-
inate the differences. Even in areas
where the advantages are obvious,
such harmonization can be diffi-
cult. For example, the harmonization
of copyright law, measured from the
foundation of the Association Littdraire
et Artistique Internationale in 1878 to
the time the last three major holdouts
(the United States, China, and Russia)
became parties to the Berne Conven-
tion, took well over a century. And
relatively few people in any country
hold copyrights of any value; nor does
copyright touch deeply held cultural
values concerning the relationship of
the individual, the family, and society.
Even so, the harmonization achieved
after more than a century of diligent
efforts remains imperfect and requires
constant adjustment.
Death, in contrast, touches every
individual in every country. A global
law of inheritance is tus unlikely. Even
the European Union, with its enhanced
ability to bring about regional harmoni-
zation of laws, acknowledges that
"[a]s full harmonisation of the rules of
substantive law in te Member States is
inconceivable, action will have to focus
on the conflct rules." But even ths may
prove impossible: because most of the
countries of the European Union draw
their inheritance laws from the civil
law tradition and because that tradition
is so greatly at odds with UK expec-
tations, achieving any compromise
palatable to both sides is likely to prove
unusually difficult.
In the earlier stages of the process,
few seemed to perceive the magnitude
of the problem. The 2005 EU Green
Paper co ments blithely that "[tihe
legal systems of all the Member States
protect the near relatives of a deceased
person who tries to disinherit them."
In fact, the legal system of the United
Kingdom does no such thing, beyond
the protections against being left in
poverty provided by the Inheritance
Act.
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The House of Lords responded to
the Green Paper with alarm, identify-
ing the clawback issue as the single
greatest problem with the EU proposal,
and one which would make the pro-
posal unacceptable to the UK. Article 27
of the EU Proposal all but guarantees
that the proposal will remain unaccept-
able to the United Kingdom. States may
refuse to apply the law of another state
"only if such application is incompati-
ble with the public policy of the forum,"
adding "[in particular, the applica-
tion of a rule of the law determined by
this Regulation may not be considered
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to be contrary to the public policy of
the forum on the sole ground that its
clauses regarding the reserved portion
of an estate differ from those in force in
the forum." In other words, the United
Kingdom's objection to clawbacks can-
not form the public policy grounds for
refusing to apply the foreign state's law.
Given these apparently insurmount-
able obstacles to agreement, the United
Kingdom has decided not to opt in
to the EU proposal but is continuing
to keep a careful eye on its evolution.
(Denmark, another EU member outside
the civil law tradition, has also chosen
not to opt in.)
Conclusion: How Does This
Affect the United States and
Other Non-EU Countries?
The EU proposal, as it currently stands,
is clearly unacceptable to the United
Kingdom and seems to have been
drafted in blatant disregard of the
United Kingdom's concerns. The con-
flict with U.S. law is possibly less drastic,
and in any event the European Union
has no obligation to take into account
the law of the United States or any other
nonmember state. Nonetheless, the
problem now facing the United King-
dom faces the United States as well.
The House of Lords, considering the
proposal, posed a hypothetical question
involving real property in the United
States:
A separate issue of scope is the extent
to which any EU instrument should
apply to non-Member States; for
example, to determine the governing
law where the testator died habitu-
ally resident in the UK but having a
house in Florida. We discussed the
pros and cons with Professor Har-
ris. A key consideration, in our view,
would be whether the Community
had competence to prescribe a rule
having extra-Union consequences. It
wili not surrise you that the Coin-
mittee takes a strict view of the scope
of Article 65 TC and we note that
the new Article 69d proposed by te
Refor Treaty refers to "civil matters
having cross-border implications".
The instrument would therefore not
apply on the facts posited above to
property outside the Union.
This seems too optimistic. Real
property is a special case, being by its
nature immoxable and thus perma-
nently located within the jurisdiction
of a single state. Given the inherent
difficulties in deciding the title to real
property located in the territory of
another sovereign, many legal systems
instead choose to recognize the state
in which that property is located as the
authority on title to the property.
Abetter question might be what
would happen if a testator died habitu-
ally resident in, say, France (the United
Kingdom not having opted in to the
EU proposal), leaving valuable per-
sonal property in Florida. If the French
court awarded the property to A, while
under Florida law it went to B, and B
had other personal property in France
(or in any of the other EU Member
States that had opted into the proposal),
there seems no reason to assume B's
European assets would be safe from
attachment to satisfy the French judg-
ment. Similarly, the U.S. (or other
non-EU) donee beneficiary, having
assets in Europe, of a person habitually
resident in an EU state allowing claw-
backs might find its European assets
attached to satisfy a clawback judg-
ment against the donated assets in the
United States. As noted above, this
is already possible where the assets
and the court decreeing the clawback
lie within a single country; the effect
of the EU proposal will be to expand
the number of countries in which
assets might be vulnerable to the same
clawback.
The question, as always, is one of
degree rather than of kind. Attempted
clawbacks, an extraordinary and
unusual device available in some U.S.
states under some circumtances, may
begin to show up more frequently
as foreign claimants or U.S. clai-
ants seek to enforce forced heirship
rights under foreign law against U.S.
donees. The process is likely to be a
gradual one and can be addressed as
it becomes a problem; a more likely
undesirable consequence is not that
clawbacks may become an actual prob-
lem for the U.S. legal systern, but that
the increased possibility of clawbacks
may act as a deterrent to some donors
and thus reduce charitable giving. U
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